L Introduction
On January 7, 1997, the United States Supreme Court heard the oral arguments in Strate v. A-1 Contractors This case arose from a ruling adverse to tribal interests by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It involves an issue that has engendered much interest and commentary but has never been confronted directly, either by Congress or the courts. That is, whether the tribal courts may adjudicate civil actions between two non-Indians.
The incident which led to Strate occurred on November 9, 1990, when a truck and car, belonging to two non-Indians, collided on a state highway which traversed a reservation. This case focuses on an issue vitally important to the integrity and viability of tribal nations, the continuing struggle of the *Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
II. Civil Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
Tribal courts possess exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over claims "brought by or against" an Indian person that arise in Indian country. 7 Willianr involved an action against an Indian in state court by a reservationbased non-Indian general store operator. Williams, reaffirming an earlier case which had laid a clear foundation, pronounced that absent some clear congressional authority, the states have no authority in Indian country except when no significant Indian interests exist.' Since Williams, many tribes have begun to exercise civil authority over non-Indians for their on-reservation activities.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, a default judgment was entered against the non-Indian defendants in the tribal court." 0 The Supreme Court concluded that the "extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions," and then remanded the case so the tribal court remedies could be exhausted." National Farmers established the exhaustion requirement of tribal court remedies under section 1331 of the Judicial Code 2 before access to the federal courts becomes available. As a result, the Judicial Code restricts easy access to the federal courts when a non-Indian alleges the tribal court possesses no power to adjudicate a claim. However, the Supreme Court in National Farmers failed to address the civil adjudicatory powers of the tribe over non-Indians. 
S. 164 (1973).
McClanahan involved the state taxation of a reservation Indian for income earned exclusively on the reservation. Id. at 165-66. The court limited the Williams test to situations principally involving non-Indians and held the state possessed no jurisdiction to impose such a tax over a reservation Indian. Id. at 179-81.
8. Williams carries the basic core of Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), into the 1970s -the inability of state law and power to intrude into Indian country. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. Therefore, the basic policy of Worcester remains, although, with some modification.
9. 471 U.S. 845 (1985) . 10 . Id. at 845.
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action was instituted in the Blackfeet Tribal Court by LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, against Iowa Mutual Insurance Company for injuries incurred within the reservation boundaries. 6 The Court concluded that a federal court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction 7 before the tribal court system has had an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.,"
Both National Farmers and Iowa Mutual Insurance involved defendants who tried to leap-frog tribal courts by proceeding directly to federal court upon being served with papers to appear in tribal court. After these cases, then, defendants must contest jurisdiction in the tribal court before going to federal court.
A-]
Contractors is the first case to come to the Supreme Court after exhaustion in tribal court.'"
III. Civil Tribal Regulatory Authority
Several cases have denied the extension of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians, that is, the application of tribal law to the given situation. In Montana v. United States," a case which severely restricted tribal sovereignty, the Court determined that the Crow Tribe of Montana did not possess the authority to prohibit hunting and fishing on lands owned in fee simple within the reservation by non-members.' As a result of this decision, the Montana Court established the general rule that tribes may not regulate non-Indian activity on fee land within the reservation.
The Montana Court created two exceptions where the tribe may properly exercise its authority. First, the Court stated, "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members." ' Second, "[a] tribe may... retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." [Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/5 presumption against tribal regulation of conduct by non-Indians under certain circumstances, absent proof that one of the two Montana exceptions had been met." Eight years later, in a case which can, at best, be described as employing the Montana analysis, the Supreme Court examined the issue of tribal zoning of fee land within the reservation. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,' the Supreme Court, presenting a fractured 4-2-3 opinion,' determined that the tribes possessed zoning authority over the closed part of the reservation, including the non-Indian fee lands.' Only three percent of the closed area land was owned in fee simple.' The open area consisted of mostly agricultural areas with almost fifty percent being owned in fee by non-Indians. 9 This fractionation in the open area resulted in major checkerboarding and an integrated community that had lost its Indian character.
Applying the Montana test, the Court in Brendale further limited the tribes' ability to rely on these exceptions when asserting tribal regulatory jurisdiction as against a state's exercise of such authority. Basically, Brendale resulted in an application of the Montana standard with an added, somewhat subtle, variation: "The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe." As a result of this variation, the Montana exceptions now rest on shakier ground. 
IV. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
Throughout this nation's political history, a struggle has existed between the federal, state, and tribal governments as to which respective sovereign properly possesses the right to govern in any given situation. Indian tribes maintain all the sovereign powers which have been rightfully theirs since time immemorial except those that have been "qualified or limited by treaties, agreements, or specific acts of Congress." 35 Tribes do not act only when Congress has so deemed it. "The point to remember is that all of the powers were once held by the tribes, not the U.S. government." ' These inherent powers include the following:
(1) The power to determine the form of government.
(2) The power to define conditions for membership in the nation. Since the 1940s, the highway operated as a Bureau of Indian Affairs gravel service road that ran to the tribal headquarters. 4 The building of the Garrison Dam and Lake Sakakawea forced the tribal headquarters to move. Today, Highway 8 terminates at the shores of Lake Sakakawea." Due to the lake, the Tribes desired to pave this road to serve the isolated Twin Buttes tribal community. 47 The highway functions as a passage way to the two dock sites located at or around Twin Buttes; however, it is not a major thoroughfare. 55. These parties will be subsequently referred to collectively as A-I Contractors. 56. Strate, 1992 WL 696330, at *1. 57. One noted scholar described the issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as follows:
38.
Personal jurisdiction, the authority to bring a particular defendant before a court, is not at issue in this case. Rather, the case potentially involves two other kinds of jurisdiction: (1) civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, sometimes known as subject matter jurisdiction, the authority to decide a particular type of case; and (2) regulatory or legislative jurisdiction, the authority to apply a state's or tribe's law to conduct occurring within the state or tribe. Newton, supra note 4.
The applicable tribal code provisions involved in the instant case are set out below: Chapter 1, Section 3: Jurisdiction of the Courts Subsection 3. 2 -Jurisdiction -Territorial The jurisdiction of the court shall extend to any and all lands and territory within the Reservation boundaries, including all easements, fee patented lands, rights of way; and over land outside the Reservation boundaries held in trust for Tribal members or the Tribe. Subsection 3.3 -Jurisdiction -Personal Subject to any limitations or restrictions imposed by the constitution or laws of the United States, the Court shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons who reside, enter, or transact business within the territorial boundaries of the reservation; provided that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians shall extend as permitted by case law.
Subsection 3.5 -Jurisdiction -Subject Matter The Court shall have jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation, and over all criminal offenses which are enumerated in this Code, and which are committed within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.
Chapter 2, Section 3(f): Long Arm Statute Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court during any of the following acts:
1) The transaction of any business of the Reservation;
The tribal court denied the motion to dismiss for three reasons. First, Mrs. Fredericks was a resident of the Fort Berthold Indian community with the right to avail herself of the tribal court system. Second, the "consensual" business relationship between A-I contractors and the tribe made jurisdiction proper over A-1 Contractors. Third, no federal law, treaty or constitutional provisions precluded an exercise of jurisdiction.
Appeals from the tribal court are taken to the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals. After an adverse finding in the tribal court, A-1 Contractors appealed the jurisdictional finding to the intertribal appeals court, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court of appeals then remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their ruling.
Before 2) The commission of any act which results in accrual of a tort action within the Reservation;
3 The. issue of personal jurisdiction of the Tribal Court over A-I was raised in and reached by the Tribal Court (citation omitted), the Tribal Court of Appeals (citation omitted), and the federal district court (citation omitted). All of these courts found that the Tribal Court has personal jurisdiction over A-I. Before the Court of Appeals, A-I raised only the issue of subject matter, not personal, jurisdiction (citation omitted). . This organization of tribal judges from North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Nebraska represents twentyfive tribal court systems. Id. at *1. The Tribal Judges Association was particularly concerned with their ability to perform their duties if the lower court's decision was upheld. "The Court below has emasculated the ability of tribal courts to provide remedies for both Indians and nonIndians in routine domestic relations cases, tort actions, consumer matters and other disputes that are brought before tribal courts on a daily basis." Language espoused in the en bane decision also caused a deep concern to arise.
Id.
Throughout the lower court's opinion the terms non-Indian and non-member are used almost interchangeably. For example, the Court below announces the tribal court subject matter jurisdiction rule of an Indian tribal court as follows: "a valid tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction 
VII. The Decisions

A. The District Court Decision
The district court, referring generally to Iowa Mutual Insurance, held that tribal courts possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians unless specifically restricted by treaty or federal statute.' In this case, the court declared, such a limitation over civil causes of action arising on the reservation had not occurred.' The court relying on Oliphant" concluded that tribal civil jurisdiction had not been similarly limited, and determined that "the development of the principles governing civil jurisdiction have been different than those governing criminal jurisdiction." ' The tribal code clearly provided problems that concern the sovereign, such as high rates of drug or alcohol use among drivers, underage drivers, or uninsured drivers. The may also indicate a need for safety belt laws, child restraint requirements, or modifications in the roads or road signage. Accidents also implicate the government's interest because they frequently require governmental services to address the effects of such accidents. The injured may require ambulance services, medical attention, or other services. Id. at *13.
Fourth, many other Tribes expressed concern about this case because it may affect their own tribal court systems. The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, SissetonWahpeton Sioux Tribe, Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and Red Lake Band of Chippewa joined to support the petitioners. for personal and subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the tribal court could properly exercise both.
B. The First Three-Judge Appellate Court Decision
First, the three-judge appellate court held that it was not erroneous for the district court to determine that the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction.' Second, the court held that Montana, and the Montana exceptions, were not applicable to the case at bar." Dismissing the Montana exceptions as inapplicable, the court proclaimed that the general divestiture of general civil jurisdiction as found in Montana related only to fee land owned by non-Indians, a circumstance not found here.
The court addressed two other issues. The first regarded the exhaustion of tribal remedies, and the second issue involved federal court abstention. The tribal remedies had been exhausted, thereby benefitting the three-judge appellate court because they now had advantage of the tribal court's expertise and analysis."' As a result of the policies expressed in Iowa Mutual Insurance' and National Farmers Union,' this additional benefit correlated to the federal government's long-standing policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment, including tribal courts and self-determination.
An explicit finding of no limiting treaty provision or federal statute allowed a conclusion that the tribal court's exercise of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians in Indian country had not been restricted. ' Thus, the court was able to reason,"'[c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute." 75 In the alternative under the Montana analysis, the panel determined that both exceptions had been met. First, a consensual relationship existed because of the subcontract." Second, the tribe had an important and legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of its members and residents on the roads and highways within the Reservation." 68. Id. at *5. 1982) . Merrion is the seminal case on tribal taxation of non-Indian activities on a reservation, wherein the Court concluded that ."Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations.'" Id. at 140-41. They "are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." Id. Also, "the Tribe's authority to tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation does not simply derive from the Tribe's power to exclude such person, but is an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial management." Id.
83 
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The en banc appellate court asserted that Montana and Brendale did not limit their discussions or rationales to only jurisdictional issues arising on fee lands." Rather, "Montana explicitly addressed the authority of tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction on the reservation, as well as on non-Indian fee lands." ' The court, therefore, concluded that any effort to limit Montana and Brendale to fee land jurisdictional issues was not supported by either one of these cases. 9 Next, a discussion ensued concerning the distinctions between the Iowa Mutual Insurance tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction line of cases versus the Montana tribal regulatory jurisdiction line of cases. The court noted that this distinction did appear in some commentaries, irregardless such a "distinction [did] not appear explicitly, or even implicitly, anywhere in the case law." ' However, in Montana and those line of cases involving regulatory jurisdiction, nothing suggests that their reasoning was limited to a consideration of tribal authority being regulatory in nature. Actually, those cases involved civil jurisdiction in broad and unqualified terms 3 The en banc court went on to suggest that "some of the language in Iowa Mutual, Williams, and Merrion can be viewed in isolation to create tension with Montana."" All of these cases read together established one broad, comprehensive scheme:
[A] valid tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian or nonmember, but once the tribal interest is established, a presumption arises that tribal courts have jurisdiction over the non-Indian or nonmember unless that jurisdiction is affirmatively limited by federal law.
The Court made the observation in isolation in a case dealing with the tribe's authority to impose a severance tax on non-Indians on the reservation. The Court found this taxation power was derived either from the tribe's inherent power of self-government or the power to exclude.., both of which are consistent with the inherent powers the tribe retains over nonmembers described in Montana 
D. The Supreme Court Decision
On April 28, 1997, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, in one of the most anti-Indian and deleterious decisions of recent vintage." The court declared that tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land" Indeed, the Supreme Court maintained that a nonmember civil action of this type fell under the state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance." Hence, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highways, the tribal court was without authority to act." The Court made clear, however, that they were not addressing the issue of the governing law or proper forum when an accident arises on a tribal road within a reservation." ® The Court relied on three basic premises to justify its decision. First, absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers' 'conduct exists only in limited circumstances.'' Second, Montana controlled the disposition of this case, and neither Iowa Mutual nor National Farmers established a rule contrary to Montana." Third, the rightof-way North Dakota acquired resembled and was equivalent to, for nonmember governance purposes, non-Indian owned land within the reservation."w Prior to beginning their legal analysis, the Court reiterated a fact completely superfluous to the issue at hand, "'the state forum is physically much closer by road to the accident scene . . . than [was] the tribal courthouse.""' Citing to Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe"°S for the proposition of limited tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers, the Court, thus, leads into their discussion of Montana v. United States." As a general rule, Montana only established that Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within the reservation, subject to the two exceptions. The general rule and the exceptions announced in Montana only apply in the absence of a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute. Nothing more may be extracted from National Farmers than this: "a prudential exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts 'to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting [or rejecting] jurisdiction."" An examination of Iowa Mutual followed to show that the exhaustion rule pronounced in National Farmers was a prudential rule, not a jurisdictional rule, based on comity."' The statement relied on heavily by the petitioners and the United States that "civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts,"" ' did not limit the Montana rule. Rather, it only stood for the unremarkable proposition that in such cases where nonmembers enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or tribal members, or where the on-reservation activity of nonmembers affects the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe, then civil jurisdiction presumptively lies within the tribal courts." ' The Court held that absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction, as to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."' "Subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts, with respect to non-Indian fee lands, generally 'does not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.""' (1985)). Also, referred to was a footnote from National Farmers indicating that exhaustion was not an unyielding requirement:
We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction 'is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 1411 n.7 (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citation omitted)). To prevail, the petitioner had to fulfill the two Montana exceptions. The petitioners failed to meet this burden under either exception to the Court's satisfaction. The kinds of cases that fell under the first Montana exception, a consensual relationship, comprise the following: the on-reservation sales transaction between nonmember plaintiffs and member defendants," tribal permit tax on nonmember-owned livestock within reservation boundaries," tribal permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting business within reservation borders,'
" and the tribal tax of on-reservation cigarette sales to nonmembers."
These type of cases also reflect the category of nonmember activities contemplated by the second Montana exception." Nonmembers who recklessly drive on such a road endanger all in the area, and undoubtedly imperil the security and safety of tribal members. "But if Montana's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule." The Court concluded with the following pronouncement in footnote 14:
When ...it is plain that no federal grant provided for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such conduct. As in criminal proceedings, state or federal courts will be the only forums competent to adjudicate those disputes. Therefore, when tribal-court jurisdiction over an action such as this one is challenged in federal court, the otherwise applicable exhaustion 116 
A. Why Montana Differs Theoretically
Montana is inapplicable to Strate v. A-i Contractors because of the vast differences between tribal adjudicatory and regulatory authority. Tribal adjudicatory authority concerns the power of a tribal court to decide a particular type of case. Whereas, tribal regulatory authority stems from the application of tribal laws to the facts of the case." Montana and the cases employing a similar line of reasoning are simply incompatible with Strate. The regulatory cases concerned issues intricately tied to non-Indian owned land and the regulation thereof by the tribes. Montana and Brendale simply establish a premise based upon land formerly owned by the tribe. That is, once an Indian tribe conveys its land to non-Indians, the former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands was lost. "The general divestiture of tribal civil jurisdiction over the activities of nonIndians recognized in Montana is applicable only to fee lands owned by nonIndians."' 
NOTES
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through other states frequently with the understanding that such conduct makes them subject to that sovereign's laws. No distinction should arise when such activity leads them into reservation boundaries. In the instant case, a sign had been posted alerting travellers that they were entering the reservation. This should function as sufficient notice for all concerned. Prohibiting tribal court jurisdiction emasculates the ability of the tribal police to effectively patrol and enforce the relevant laws against violators. At the very least, concurrent jurisdiction ought to exist between the tribe and the state.
B. How Montana Differs Factually
The Supreme Court strained to apply Montana; however, the facts do not support its contentions. By equating the right-of-way, only a limited easement, with the non-Indian owned fee land at issue in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland, the Court struggled to thrust this case into the general rule of Montana. The road operated as a BIA gravel service road to the tribal headquarters. The federal water resource project under control of the Army Corp of Engineers forced the tribal headquarters to move. Also, as a result, existing Indian communities were isolated. Due to this isolation, the tribe desired to have this road paved. Indeed, Highway 8 does not even function as a major thoroughfare.
According to the Court, this road, along with the right-of-way, was created only for access to the federal water resource project. The facts simply do not support this contention! The Court went on to further reason that the "rightof-way (was] open to the public, and traffic on it [was] subject to State control. The Tribes have consented to, and received payment for, the State's use of the 6.59-mile stretch for a public highway. They have retained no gatekeeping right."' 29 Noticeably absent from the Court's factual summation were the facts leading up to the tribe's displacement, isolation and reasons for acquiescing to the limited easement.
Foremost, this road was paved for access to the isolated Indian communities, and then for accessibility to the federal water resource project. Therefore, the Court's alignment of the right-of-way with land alienated to non-Indians should not suffice to skirt around Montana, Brendale, and Bourland. Hence, Montana should not apply using this land-based approach, as the government still held the land underlying the right-of-way in trust for the Tribe. 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/5 dual tribal and state rules and regulations applicable to the highway. The BIA, tribe, and state police all take responsibility for enforcing the relevant rules and regulations and patrolling the highway, with the BIA and the tribe acting as the primary enforcers. The Court further declared that absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highways, the tribal court lacked the authority to act. However, Congress has repeatedly implemented broad mandates relating to Indian people, which the Court obviously ignored in Strate, signaling that the tribe not only should have, but must have, general civil jurisdiction to survive as a politically self-sufficient entity. Additionally, congressional action should not even be necessary, as the tribes retain all those inherent powers not expressly revoked. However, since the Strate Court decided otherwise, Congress must now enact legislation authorizing tribal jurisdiction over accidents.
C. Congressional Affirmation of the Tribal Courts
Beginning with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934,' Congress sought to encourage tribal entities to rebuild, thus "laying the foundation for Indian tribal governments after years of domination by the federal government." ' ' Congress' intent was to protect the tribe's political integrity and powers of self-governance. Under the IRA, many tribes adopted constitutions or organized pursuant to their inherent sovereign power. Tribes set up their own court systems and code of laws or elected to remain under the Bureau of Indian Affairs Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR Courts).'
32
In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act' was enacted. This Act has been the cornerstone of the Federal Government's Indian policy for over two decades. The tribes were given the authority to contract with the federal government to operate programs serving their tribal members." Self-determination promotes the tribal operation of federal programs and services administered by the BIA and the Indian Health Service.' The origins of Self-Determination, more commonly referred to as P.L. 93-638 or "638", can be traced back to President Nixon's 1970 "Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs" which stated:
For years we have talked about encouraging Indians to exercise greater self-determination, but our progress has never been commensurate with our promises. Part of the reason for this situation has been the threat of termination. But another reason is the fact that when a decision is made as to whether a federal program will be turned over to Indian administration, it is the federal authorities and not the Indian people who finally make that decision.
This situation should be reversed. In my judgment, it should be up to the Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing to as;ume administrative responsibility for a service program which is presently administered by a federal agency." (1995). This statement was made pursuant to President Clinton's 1994 mandate requiring federal agencies to deal with Indian governments on a government-to-government basis when treaty or tribal govemment rights are in contention. 1 PUB. PAPERS 800-03 (1994).
In every relationship between our people, our first principle must be to respect your right to remain who you are, and to live the way you wish to live. And I believe the best way to do that is to acknowledge the unique government-togovernment relationship we have enjoyed over time. Today I reaffirm our commitment to self-determination for tribal governments.
This then is our first principle -respecting your values, your religions, your identity and your sovereignty. This brings us to the second principle that should guide our relationship. We must dramatically improve the federal government's relationships with the tribes and become full partners with the tribal nations.
I don't want there to be any mistake about our commitment to a stronger partnership between our people. Therefore, in a moment, I will also sign an historic government directive that requires every executive department and agency of government to take two simple steps: first, to remove all barriers that prevent them from working directly with tribal governments; and second, to make certain that if they take action affecting tribal resources, they consult with tribal governments prior to that decision. It is the entire government, not simply the Department of the Interior, that has a trust responsibility with tribal governments. And it is time the entire government recognized and honored that responsibility.
D. Congressional Limitations on Tribal Expressions of Self-Government
When Congress has intended to permit a restraint on tribal self-government and the punishment of offenses, it has done so specifically. Four statutes in particular reflect this preemption of tribal authority by the assumption of federal jurisdiction. The applicable statutes govern criminal jurisdiction and are set out in sections 1151, 1152, 1153, and 13 of Title 18 of the United States Code. A number of federal statutes that have nothing to do with any of the above mentioned statutes will also govern conduct in Indian country because federal jurisdiction will remain generally applicable everywhere. 45 Section 1151 gives the definition of Indian country. Three different types of Indian country exist: reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments.'" Section 1152 involves the Federal Enclaves, the General Crimes Act, and the Interracial Crimes Act. Through section 1152, the body of federally defined crimes now extends to Indian country, exclusive of state jurisdiction; for example, the laws generally applicable to military bases and federal parks.
Five exceptions have arisen from the various twists and interpretations given to this statute. First, this section does not apply to offenses of crimes between Indians, generally referred to as intra-Indian crime. The tribes retain all the powers not limited by treaties, agreements, or specific acts of Congress. It is clear that these inherent powers include the right to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians when such persons enter the territory under a tribe's control. Without this basic right, the tribes' ability to maintain law and order within their territories will be virtually paralyzed. This right is fundamental to their survival. The Supreme Court shifted this presumption to that of non-jurisdiction absent an express congressional statute or treaty granting such jurisdiction, which clearly goes against one of the basic tenets underlying the inherent sovereignty concept and stands in direct conflict with prevailing congressional policy.
Many of the tribal courts currently in existence originated from the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. One expression of sovereignty arises from the creation of tribal judicial systems." s In the last fifteen to twenty years, tribal court systems have evolved and developed significantly." Many issues, such as domestic relations, child custody, probate, tort, and criminal prosecutions, may achieve a more satisfactory resolution in tribal judicial systems because of their special strengths.' The methods utilized by tribal courts should not be limited to only intra-tribal disputes. These methods lend themselves to the resolution of conflicts "between one tribe and another, and between a tribe and the State and Federal government, political units, private investors, or contractors." ' As the role of the tribal courts proceeds to develop, these courts have an "increasingly important role to play in the administration of the laws of our nation."'
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Montana should not apply because of the differences previously mentioned between regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. However, if one must proceed under the general rule of Montana, then an exception ought to exist misdemeanor jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994). The relevant portion of the statute states: "[P]owers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers pos.essed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians ....
Id. § 1301(2).
155. Johnson, supra note 128, at 29. 157. Id. at 13. "The special strengths of the tribal courts -their proximity to the people served, the closeness of the relations among the parties and the court, their often greater flexibility and informality -give tribal courts special opportunities to develop alternative methods of dispute resolution." Id.
158. /d.
159.
I. at 14.
to the strict non-Indian distinction. "Civil jurisdiction on the reservation is almost entirely tribal. '" " Tribal courts possess civil jurisdiction in matters involving Indians, and when incidents affect tribal interests.
It is presumed that tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians because of the judicially created premise of Oliphant.
6 ' As to civil jurisdiction, the opposite presumption governs." That is, when the activities of non-Indians affect the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare, then the tribe may properly exercise jurisdiction.'" However, when such activity by non-Indians does not impact tribal interests, then the tribe may not properly exercise jurisdiction. ' "If two non-Indians, for example, are in a traffic accident on the reservation, a lawsuit by one driver against the other has to be brought in state and not in tribal court."'" 5 If just one of the parties is Indian, then this should suffice to confer jurisdiction upon the tribal judicial system." Thus, essentially every reservation-based activity by a non-Indian affecting Indians or Indian property exposes one to the tribe's civil jurisdiction."
If Montana does apply to the instant case, then the Court should have developed an examination to discover the reasons that the tribal interests are affected when the subject of the suit involves two non-Indians. Gisela Fredericks was married to a deceased tribal member. For many years, Gisela Fredericks had lived on the reservation. She was an imbedded member of the community with verifiable ties to the Indian community. Her monetary loss, pain, and suffering detrimentally impacted her five children, who claimed tribal membership. Any adverse action against Gisela Fredericks substantially threatened the tribal interests and the Indian community. Additionally, the tribe had a considerable interest in protecting the health and safety of those traveling on their roads and highways within the reservation.
A-1 Contractors entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe by entering upon and transacting business within reservation. More than likely, A-1 employed tribal members because the contractual relationship required A-I to follow the employment rights code. A lawsuit against A-1 might have caused layoffs and other negative repercussions, thus directly affecting the economic security of the community in which A-1 worked. Accordingly, both non-Indian parties have extensive ties to the community. Therefore, Montana should not apply because Indian issues are implicated, even though technically the accident arose between two non-Indians.
preclude an exercise of civil jurisdiction, a much less intrusive exercise of jurisdiction.
X. Conclusion
"The federal judiciary is embracing the conservative, indeed, reactionary posture of the 1890s, and as the pendulum swings even further to the right, there is a danger that Plessy v. Ferguson will once again become mainstream onstitutional law."'" In 1866 when Congress enacted the first Civil Rights Act outlawing segregation, the United States Supreme Court struck it down, thereby allowing people to discriminate based on public accommodations. The Supreme Court frustrated Congress' intent, and the Jim Crow laws were allowed to persist, finally being struck down in Brown v. Board of Education." The Supreme Court stymied progress in this area for over one hundred years. Just as in this case, the Court has successfully frustrated the federal government's long-standing policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment, including tribal courts and self-determination.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether Montana standards apply to adjudicatory jurisdiction; and (2) if Montana does apply, what is the appropriate application. The proper conclusion to draw between the National Farmers Union line of cases and the Montana lines of cases is this: National Farmers Union, and subsequent cases, concerned tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, whereas, the Montana case, and those relying on its rationale, should be limited to areas where tribal-state regulatory jurisdiction conflicts arise on non-Indian owned fee land, such as over hunting and fishing permits.
Many non-Indian plaintiffs have brought suits in tribal courts against Indian defendants since the Williams v. Lee decision without suffering adversely or needlessly. Today, in 1997, it should not matter whether the defendant is Indian or non-Indian. The Supreme Court should not have endorsed nor allowed such a deleterious decision to stand.
An analysis of Indian issues needs to occur involving those with the most to lose, Indian people, to fit the realities of this day and age, instead of relying on stale law and perpetuating the discrimination of old on a new generation of Indian people. The time has come for those in power to listen to the leaders of the Indian Nations. Congress should act immediately to restore some sanity to this area of the law.
172. Deloria, Jr., supra note 35, at 963 (citing Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the state prosecution of Plessy when he refused to leave the coach reserved for whites)).
173. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (concluding that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place). 174. Can nine unelected people really do better than the legislature through the people?
